April 27, 1994 opened a new chapter in South African political history. It marked the moment when the leaders of South Africa's anti-apartheid social movements entered the corridors of political power. As has happened so often in newly liberated countries, the euphoria of the political transition led many to expect that the need for adversarial social struggle with the state was over. For a while after 1994 this expectation tended to inform much civil society activity and stifled social struggles, but this response was by no means uniform. Some social struggles did take place. Labour struggles, for example, exploded in the immediate aftermath of the first nonracial general elections. Spontaneous social eruptions occurred around the issues of demarcation and crime, but these in most cases quickly dissipated, and state-civil society engagements came to be largely defined by collaborative relations.
This collaborative relationship between the state, on one hand, and the unions and civics, on the other, was partly facilitated by the new government's attempts to create an enabling political and fiscal environment. Corporatist institutions like NEDLAC, the National Economic Development and Labour Council, were established and NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) were provided representation in this forum through the establishment of a development chamber. Legislation was promulgated that enabled the registration of NGOs and CBOs. Public funding agencies, like the National Development Agency (NDA), were established to direct financial resources to the sector, and most importantly, government enabled the sub-contracting of development services to a number of civil society actors, thereby entrenching the collegiate logic of state-civil society relations during the immediate post-apartheid phase.
Unlike in many other transitional societies where the political honeymoon tended to drag on for decades, new social struggles in South Africa emerged surprisingly quickly. In fact, they tended in the main to coincide with South Africa's second democratic election and the ascension to the Presidency by Thabo Mbeki. His term of office witnessed the emergence of social struggles on a range of fronts. Three related, but distinct developments prompted these struggles. Some were directed against one or another policy of government. The classic case here is the Congress of South African Trade Union's (COSATU) opposition to the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which represents the post-apartheid government's decision to engage with trade liberalisation and pursue economic growth as the mechanism for promoting social justice. Other struggles focused on government's partial failure in service delivery. The most noted examples are the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) that respectively address the slow pace of land redistribution and government's failure to provide an adequate response to the HIV/AIDS crisis. Finally, some struggles emerged to directly challenge the enforcement of government policies and to resist government attempts at repression. The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the Concerned Citizens Group (CCG), the Anti Eviction Campaign (AEC), are all attempts to organise poor and marginalised communities to resist local, provincial and national governments' attempts to cut off electricity and water, and to evict residents. The sheer scale and diversity of these social struggles has raised concern in official circles and prompted a number of scholars to turn their attention to this emerging phenomenon (e.g. Bond 2000 , Marais 1998 ).
How do we understand these contemporary social struggles? Some studies have collectively referred to these as social movements (Desai 2002 ), but, is this a fair description? Definitions of social movements abound. Charles Tilly suggests that "the proper analogy to a social movement is neither a party nor a union but a political campaign. What we call a social movement actually consists in a series of demands or challenges to power-holders in the name of a social category that lacks an established political position" (1985: 735-36) . Elizabeth Jelin provides more form to this definition when she defines movements "as forms of collective action with a high degree of popular participation, which use non-institutional channels, and which formulate their demands while simultaneously finding forms of action to express them, thus establishing themselves as collective subjects, that is, as a group or social category" (Jelin 1986 quoted in Escobar and Alvarez 1992: 15) . We understand these social movements to largely exist within that sphere defined as civil society: "the organised expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state, and the market" (Habib and Kotze 2002:3, Habib 2003) .
Social movements are thus, in our view, politically and/or socially directed collectives, often involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within which they are located. This then suggests that we should be circumspect about categorizing all of South Africa's contemporary struggles as social movements. Some clearly meet the criteria of the above definition of a social movement, while others do not. Most of those that do not are not popularly located, nor do they establish a distinct collective identity. Yet even in these cases, some of these social struggles have the potential to evolve into such movements in the future.
The paper is structured in four parts. Part two, which follows, surveys and reviews the various theoretical paradigms that have emerged to explain social movements with a view to identifying appropriate approaches to investigate their emergence, form and impact in South Africa. Part three explains the crucial phenomenon of globalisation and how it manifests itself in parts of the developing world, and in particular, in South Africa. Part four undertakes a scan of contemporary social struggles in the country, and dissects this to enable provisional explanations of why these organisations and movements have emerged, who their constituencies are, what influences their choice of strategies and tactics, and most importantly, what the implications are of their emergence for the political and socio-economic evolution of state and society. These provisional explanations facilitate the generation of six sets of arguments and questions, which are detailed in the final section.
A Survey of Social Movement Theories
Investigations of social movements commonly build upon three central aspects relevant to our understanding of mobilisation: the structure of opportunities and constraints within which movements may or may not develop, the networks, structures and other resources which actors employ to mobilise supporters, and the ways in which movement participants define or frame their movement. Analyses of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes include a wide range of theoretical perspectives from structural materialist approaches to mobilisation to constructivist understandings of identity. They therefore work together to bridge approaches to "old" and "new" social movements, bringing together movements for liberation, independence and freedom which often sought revolutionary change and the overthrow of the state with the "self-limiting radicalism" of "new" social movements (Cohen 1985: 664) which demanded greater equality and rights without challenging the structure of the formally democratic state and the market economy. This three-pronged approach also offers important insights into the so-called "new-new" (della Porta 2003) transnational movements which press for alternative globalisations and in so doing challenge powerful transnational and global political and economic structures. In this way, these three aspects of social movement inquiry productively accommodate the analysis of significantly different movements across time and space.
As a first step, structuralist discussions of political opportunity importantly seek to understand the contexts within which mobilisation is more or less likely. Approaches to political opportunity incorporate the insights from theorists of collective behaviour (Oberschall 1993; Smelser 1971 ) by pointing to the importance of broader structural openings and instabilities to which actors may respond. Political opportunity theorists also underline Piven and Cloward's central insights into the importance of institutions to both "create and limit opportunities for mass struggles " (1979: xv) . They therefore work to connect broader structural and institutional configurations to the prospects for movement activity and the rise and decline protest cycles, but importantly do so without reducing the presence of movement activity to structural conditions.
Tarrow offers a fairly concise definition of political opportunity structure: "consistent -but not necessarily formal, permanent or national -dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure " (1994: 85) . McAdam expands upon this by identifying four dimensions of political opportunity which most authors employing the term agree upon: "The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergrid a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; the state's capacity and propensity for repression " (1996: 27) . Changes in political opportunity structure would therefore include shifts in any one or more of these four dimensions. It is important to stress that state actors can provide opportunities through their engagement or disengagement, and that forms of engagement clearly vary; for example: while a participatory corporatist system may open opportunities, a co-optive corporatist structure will work to diminish them. Finally, not only elites but also counter-elites play crucial roles in defining political openings.
Political opportunity theorists also point to the formation of protest cycles which begin with an increase in structurally created political opportunities which are then expanded by movements as they successfully mobilise, offering greater opportunities for the creation of new movements. In this way, political opportunity is not simply given but is also strongly affected by the actions of collective actors. Protest cycles are expanded by heightened mobilisation and rapid innovation as different actors learn from and improve upon existing models of collective action. Either increasing popular acceptance of many of the claims made by the participants or increasing state repression may spell the end of a cycle of heightened protest. Alternatively, disillusionment, frustration and even boredom on the part of the movement participants may lead to a decline in protest and possibly the disappearance of formerly popular movements (Castells 1983; Tarrow 1994; Zuern 2001) . Political opportunity approaches therefore offer significant contributions to the study of social movements by highlighting the opportunities for action and suggesting the possible forms that movements will take as they respond to the context in which they organise. Opportunity structures cannot, however, explain the rise of new movements on their own.
Movements also importantly build upon existing human and material resources. The investigation of mobilizing structures, which has grown out of resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald 1973) , rationalist accounts of collective action (Olson 1965) , moral economy approaches (Thompson 1971) , and political process models (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982) has underlined the need to consider not only material resources but also the formal and informal networks upon which movements are built. These networks include those that develop along class, ethnic, racial, religious, and gender lines as well as those that transcend these distinctions.
This second branch of inquiry investigates how social movement organisations are formed, what local networks they build upon, what existing institutions they employ, and what access they have to political and material resources. This conception of resources also includes established repertoires of contention, essentially the means of claim making (Tilly 1986:4) which range from peaceful sit-ins and letter writing campaigns to acts of vandalism or violent attacks upon individuals or state institutions. Though these resources exist for new movements to employ, new movements often innovate within existing repertoires. During different periods, under different regimes, various forms of protest dominate. As repertoires become outdated, social actors work to change them in response to changes in their own interests and organisation as well as the overall relationship between state and society. The changes are, however, extremely gradual; in the interim, repertoires may actually constrain action (Tilly 1986; Zuern 2001) .
Analysts who employ mobilizing structures as part of a broader inquiry, work to avoid the central criticisms levelled against earlier, more narrowly defined approaches. Melucci, for example, notes that theories based purely on resource mobilisation: "tend to explain how, but not why social movements emerge and develop," adding "resource mobilisation approaches view collective action as 'data' which is merely given. " (1989: 3) . Political opportunity approaches offer some insight into the question of "why?", but largely from the perspective of factors external to the movements themselves. In short, it is necessary to investigate the very process by which movements define themselves to fully understand the "why" of movement mobilisation and organisation.
This third area of social movement studies is based upon identity-oriented paradigms which stress the importance of social relationships for any understanding of movement activity; they therefore bring cultural frames including shared meanings, symbols and discourses into the analysis (Lichbach 1998: 407) . Analysts of new social movements such as Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989) have underlined the importance of framing, by focusing on subjective elements such as identity, status and values. Melucci reminds us that the same experiences and behaviour can be viewed in different ways; meanings depend upon systems of reference (1985: 794) . These shared meanings, defined as framing processes by Snow and others (Snow et al 1986) , are central to any understanding of social movement activity. Even the structuralist account of Piven and Cloward (1979) and the relative deprivation theory expounded by Gurr (1970) , point to the central importance of a shared feeling of grievance in order for mobilisation to occur. The oversight in these theories has been to assume that such collective framings simply appear without investigating their very construction.
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly argue: "For a growing school of 'constructionists', social movements were both carriers of meanings and makers of meaning, that, by naming grievances and expressing new identities, constructed new realities and made these identities collective" (1997: 149, italics in original). Insights from the study of socalled "identity-based" movements such as those focusing on women's and gay rights were incorporated into the study of social movements more generally to work to address questions of collective identity, consciousness and solidarity that earlier models had difficulty solving. The inclusion of these approaches underlines the importance of definitions of community, shared meanings and transcripts (Scott 1985) for any account of collective action.
Scholars from numerous perspectives have worked to bridge what they see as the primary divisions in the study of social movements (Cohen 1985; della Porta and Diana 1999; Lichbach 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, Zald 1996; Tilly 1997, 2001 ). While different authors allocate varying degrees of attention to underlying structural factors, it is quite clear that no movement can be understood without some investigation of the material structure within which it formed. Opportunity structures work either to limit collective action as in highly representative or highly repressive or totalitarian regimes or to encourage collective action such as in the clear definition of a repressive system such as apartheid around which many can rally in opposition. Second, the establishment or presence of solidarity networks is required for the "production of meaning and the mobilisation of resources" (della Porta and Diana 1999: 22) that enable popular protest. Finally, the production of shared beliefs and collective identities form the necessary but not sufficient basis for all social movements.
Before moving on to an investigation of the underlying structural conditions, both domestic and transnational, affecting recent movement activity in South Africa, it is necessary to add two more important innovations and challenges to this three-pronged perspective on movement activity. First, until relatively recently, most scholars of movements have focused upon domestic contexts and movements rather than transnational actors, constraints and opportunities. Keck and Sikkink (1998) have importantly drawn attention to transnational advocacy networks which often lead movement activists in a one country to appeal to actors beyond their borders to bring about domestic change through what they label a "boomerang" effect. A growing scholarship furthers this inquiry by focusing on the development of transnational organisations and movements particularly those challenging neo-liberal discourses of globalisation (for example : Clark 2003 , Cohen and Rai 2000 , Florini 2000 , Keane 2003 , Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002 , Klein 2001 , O'Brien et al, 2000 . These scholars have pressed researchers and activists to define opportunities, networks and identities which transcend national boundaries, to work to connect the "local" to the "global." Second, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) have recently worked to define a more dynamic approach to movement activity and collective action more generally. This approach seeks to move the focus of inquiry from one of understanding political opportunities and threats, mobilizing structures and framing processes to a framework within which greater emphasis is placed upon the very mechanisms and processes which bring about contentious action by connecting these factors. This results in a more dynamic and complex framework which effectively focuses on processes such as boundary activation (defining "us" and "them"), diffusion (the transmission of ideas and approaches to new populations), brokerage (the linking of previously unconnected actors and sites), radicalisation (the move to more extreme tactics or agendas), social appropriation (the appropriation of previously non-politicised sites or activities into sites of mobilisation), category formation (creation of a new social category), object shift (change in perceptions and relations among actors), and certification (validation of actors by an external authority). Such a framework challenges researchers to draw connections between various processes to better understand social movements and collectivities in motion.
This dynamic framework, along with the three-pronged approach outlined above with the crucial addition of transnational and global opportunities, actions, identities and constraints, offer a host of questions, approaches and mechanisms for researchers to consider when investigating popular responses to the political and socio-economic context in South Africa. In order to employ these insights, it is necessary to begin by defining the broader framework of opportunities and constraints, to investigate globalisation as it manifests itself in South Africa.
Globalisation and Marginalisation in South Africa
The term globalisation has come to dominate discourses of social, economic and cultural developments in contemporary society. Given the multifaceted processes that are often merged under its rubric, the term defies clear and precise definition. Most analysts begin, by pointing to the economic dimensions of globalisation, including: the dramatic increases in international trade and finance, the growing importance of multinational corporations in the international economy, and, more generally, the growing interconnectedness of many parts of the world. This growing interconnectedness has been characterised over the last three decades by the growing importance of new technological advances which have dramatically reduced the costs of international transactions, thereby promoting the increased movement of capital, goods and services and, to a certain extent, people. It is important to also recognise that the integration of the global economy has led to a rapid proliferation and spread of new information and communications technologies.
The forces unleashed by globalisation have had a fundamental impact on the production system, which itself has become globalised. The shift from Fordist to postFordist production strategies has led to the outsourcing of suppliers and the relocation of price-sensitive products to low cost production regions where labour is cheap. These changes in the production system have in turn fostered fundamentally reconfigured labour markets, forcing a rapid growth in new forms of informal, contract and part time working arrangements across the globe (see Standing 1999) .
These economic definitions highlight some of the key features of globalisation -the importance of trade, the growing importance of multinational corporations, the extent and ease of international capital flows, the importance of the spread of technologies and ideas, and the globalisation of production -but say very little about hierarchies of power and social relations. Others in the social sciences, however, emphasise the importance of the compression of time and space as key dimensions of globalisation (see Harvey 1989 and Giddens 1984) . Distinguishing between place and space, where the former signifies the idea of locale or geographical location, and the latter, which is structured by social relations, globalisation involves the increasing disconnection from place and connection to space. Globalisation is thus defined as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and viceversa" (Giddens 1990 ). Mittleman (2000) extends this conception of globalisation to emphasise the political dimensions of globalisation and the responses to it. He views globalisation thus:
As experienced from below: the dominant form of globalisation means historical transformation: in the economy of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally -for some, however little to begin with -such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportions above and below the territorial state; and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity's achievements or perceptions of them (2000:6).
The strength of Mittleman's concept is that it provides a framework for an analysis of how agents may respond to globalisation and therefore of the politics of globalisation. He argues: "Most agents acquiesce, but others attempt to write a script which embraces macroeconomic growth processes and new technologies while linking them to social equity and reform programs. " (2000:7) This allows us to view globalisation not just in economic terms but also as a multifaceted process with power relations which produce not only powerful forces supporting its further entrenchment but also discontents which sometimes coalesce into counter movements. In this way, globalisation has been linked to marginalisation, a term used in the literature on poverty and social policy to encompass the disadvantages of individuals, households, social groupings, or spatial areas, in terms of some social, economic, cultural or political activities or processes. Marginalisation is most often linked closely to a lack of material resources and poverty and associated with powerlessness and lack of representation and freedom.
What, then, is the impact of globalisation? There is now a large economic literature which empirically explores the effects of globalisation (see, for example, Dollar and Kraay 2000 , World Bank 2002 , Stiglitz 2002 , Sala-i-Martin 2002 , Rodrik 1999 . This empirical literature, complicated as it is by a range of measurement controversies, does not address the fundamental issues at play. This is largely because answers to this question too often take a homogenous form. For its proponents, globalisation is a necessary development that will enable society to maximise its wealth and bring prosperity to all. For its critics, it is an ominous development that increases exploitation and oppression and plunges societies into the depths of poverty and immiseration. Both these perspectives contain at least a kernel of truth, but their essential weakness is that they speak to only one side of a multifaceted process, which has differential effects among and within nations.
What then are these differential effects? To state the obvious: globalisation has both winners and losers. These winners and losers do not correspond to the neat nationalinternational divide that is so often reflected in left-leaning nationalist literature. The beneficiaries and victims of globalisation are present in both the industrialised and the developing world. This should not be surprising. After all, the defining element of globalisation is its integrative character: the erosion of national boundaries and the increasing drift to a spatially unified universe. Its effects are thus global. Recognition of this, however, must not be interpreted to mean that the effects are uniform across the globe. Indeed, since social structures vary across spatial contexts, the impact of globalisation differs dramatically across regional and national contexts. Peasant based societies, for instance, are far more adversely affected by the disciplining effects of globalisation than are societies with a high preponderance of skilled workers concentrated in knowledge-based industries.
Globalisation has transformed social structures by reorganizing the industrial sector and forcing a large percentage of organised workers into the informal economy, it also reconfigured the class alliances of the post-World War II period (see Marglin and Schor 1992) . In this new era, the domestic bourgeoisie was reconfigured into an alliance with international capital. Domestic labour was as a result thrown onto the defensive and forced into a rear guard battle to protect the gains won in an earlier phase of the accumulation process (see Held and McGrew, 2002) . The primary beneficiary of this state of affairs was capital, although this was not universally the case (Habib and Padayachee 2000) . This enhanced the negotiating power of finance capital and multinational corporations in particular vis-à-vis other social actors as a result of the increasing availability of investment sites across the world. The primary institutional casualty of this process was the nation state. Previously it served to condition and constrain capital in its quest for profit. Now capital, with its control over investment and the availability of an overabundance of investment sites, served as a constraining influence on the nation state. Increasingly, it demanded less regulation and more market-oriented policies as a cost for its investment. As the years rolled on, the nation state began making significant concessions in this regard.
Labour, as a social actor, has lost the most as a result of this process of globalisation. The enhanced power of capital, the increasingly subservient status of the nation state, and the transformation in the industrial economy unleashed by globalisation all has taken its toll. Large numbers of workers particularly in vulnerable industries have been thrown out of work or into casual labour. Gains won in the earlier accumulation phase around the social wage have largely been rolled back. And the influence of labour over the state has declined dramatically making it almost impossible to turn the political tide. Of course the effects on labour have not been equally distributed, but labour as a social category has experienced a net loss in influence, members and control over and share of society's resources.
Ironically, one sector to have benefited from globalisation, or at least from some aspects of it, is the activist layer of social movements spawned in this period. The technological and communication revolution has not only made it easier for capital to do business but has also enabled activists from across the ideological spectrum to wage their struggles. Email and cheaper global travel enables activists from different parts of the world to communicate much more easily. The internet and satellite television facilitate the universalisation of struggles, in particular because the citizenry in the industrialised countries are more easily made aware of the oppression, exploitation and immiserising conditions to which other parts of the world are subjected. As a result, in the last two decades United States and European corporates like Nike and Shell have been held accountable for their labour conditions and environmental records in other parts of the world through consumer boycotts and other forms of protest in the US and Europe. International financial agencies, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are continually confronted with street demonstrations at their annual general meetings; these protests are overwhelmingly populated by activists and citizens from the industrialised world. Seattle, Genoa, and the range of international consumer boycotts launched against a diverse set of multinational corporations for everything from the Palestinian struggle to the child labour practices would not have been possible without the increasing integration of the world through globalisation (Byers 2000) .
South Africa serves as a textbook example of how globalisation plays itself out in the semi-industrialised world. Capital has been the primary beneficiary as productivity and the return on investment dramatically improved in the last decade. The state has been largely constrained by domestic and foreign capital and has, as was indicated earlier, made significant concessions at the macro-economic policy level (Michie and Padayachee 1997) . Labour has been the principal loser in this process. COSATU's influence on its alliance partner, the ANC, has been steadily eroding throughout the transition years. Large numbers of organised workers have been retrenched, casualised and/or forced into the informal economy leading to a further expansion of the burgeoning underclasses. Some workers have done well. Senior managers and certain categories of skilled workers (including professionals) have experienced rising incomes, but they constitute a tiny proportion of the overall labour community which has been on the defensive for most of the last decade (Nattrass 2003) .
One distinctive feature of the South African case is that the globalisation process was simultaneously accompanied by a political transition from apartheid to a democratic order. The substantive compromise of this transition was the incoming regime's support for neo-liberal economic policies in exchange for capital's acceptance of black economic empowerment and some affirmative action. The result has been a globalisation process tinged by colour. Black entrepreneurs have become the primary beneficiaries as they have been included in new investment from both foreign and domestic capital, and have been provided with concessionary loans by the state and/or its financial agencies. Skilled black personnel have benefited enormously as the corporate sector has scrambled to meet equity targets in their managerial and staffing structures. Black managers and workers have been prioritised in public sector employment, but black has also been the colour of most of the victims of this neoliberal globalisation, an unfortunate legacy of the overlap of race and class categories bequeathed by Apartheid.
The net effect of this simultaneous coupling of economic globalisation with the democratic transition, in the immediate aftermath of apartheid, has been devastating. According to the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (2002: 19) , unemployment stands at 36 percent for the overall population and at 52 percent for African females. Poverty is pervasive and according to a recent committee of enquiry for the Department of Social Welfare, stands at an astounding 45 to 55 percent. About ten percent of African people are malnourished and at least 25 percent of African children are stunted (Everatt 2003: 77) . Evidence suggests that key indicators such as unemployment and the number of households without a breadwinner are deteriorating (Everatt 2003) . The level of inequality is also getting worse. South Africa has always been one of the most unequal societies in the world, and the incoming ANC government in 1994 committed itself to addressing this problem. Yet despite the post-apartheid regime's rhetorical commitment to redistribution, the Gini coefficient continued to rise throughout the ANC's first two terms of office (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 2002: 27). One factor worth noting, however, is that the racial profile of inequality is changing. This is reflected in the fact that the size of the African component in the richest income decile rose from 9 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1996. The racial profile of the poorest has, however, remained black, leading many commentators to conclude that the present economic dispensation benefits only a tiny elite within the African population. The predicament of the losers in this transition is perhaps most graphically captured in the words of Emma Makhaza in the poverty hearings hosted by the South African Human Rights Commission, NGO Coalition, and the Commission on Gender Equality: I am having seven children and nothing to depend on. I am making bricks and sometimes it rains and then I can't do it. And I collect food and take it to people. I fetch wood and collect cans of cold drink and sell them. When I am without food then I go next door and if they don't have then the children will have empty stomachs and I cry. Yesterday I left with my children fast asleep because they will ask me what we are going to eat. I am very thin because when I bought a bucket of mielie meal, I won't eat at all if I am thinking of the children. They say: Mum you are going to die (Budlander 1998: 17) .
The reinvention of social movements in post apartheid South Africa
One of the most striking features of social movements in post apartheid South Africa is that many of them are new, and a number of them emerged from the late 1990s. This is striking, in particular, because South Africa's recent political history is so integrally tied to social movements. Although some may be accused of romanticising the extent and effectiveness of civic and trade union organisation in South Africa during the apartheid era, it would be fair to say that, compared to many other countries, there has since the 1970s been a heightened level of social organisation in the country, especially in urban areas. Social movements in South Africa played a vital part in precipitating and defining the terms of the transition to democracy and indeed the liberation movement was arguably one of the quintessential social movements of the 20 th century (Figure 1 block 1) . Opposition to apartheid was, as a result of apartheid itself, necessarily extra-parliamentary. The ANC, UDF, COSATU, NGOs, and civics, formed a collective mass of democratic energy which -in combination with economic difficulties, external political pressure and changing geopolitical circumstances -resulted in the negotiated revolution of the early 1990s.
Yet, in a country whose politics were defined by an ultimately overwhelming antigovernment movement, there is only limited institutional continuity between the movements of the 1980s and those of the late 1990s. The key explanation for the newness of today's generation of social movements is that old avenues of opposition were absorbed into the post-apartheid government, thus leaving opponents of the government without a 'voice' with which to express or a mechanism to organise opposition (see Figure 1 block 2) . This marks a change in the political opportunity structure and the repertoires of contention as well as the activation of new boundaries and therefore new sets of political actors. 
Vacuum
As we argued earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the political transition of 1994, state-civil society relations changed from the adversarial opposition that characterised apartheid politics, to a more collaborative and development-oriented focus. Unlike the previous government, which did not have international or domestic legitimacy, this was now a democratically elected government that was seen to be 'working on the problem' of poverty and deprivation rather than creating or exacerbating it. Patience was exercised, and although social conditions remained difficult for the poor, communities were not inclined to mobilise (Desai 2002:1) .
Furthermore, even if communities had wanted to mobilise, the institutional environment which historically enabled this had all but disappeared. The organisational mechanisms that had been used to express opposition to government prior to the transition -the UDF, ANC, civics, NGOs -were either now part of the government or operating in close collaboration with the government: … key activists [took] jobs key jobs in parliament and other government structures. Generally, there was deep confusion in that the civics' mainly oppositional role to the state was now deemed inappropriate, as they were urged to move from "resistance to reconstruction." (Lumsden and Loftus 2003: 19) To illustrate the distance the civic movement had moved, the Sunday Times reported that SANCO had launched an investment arm in order to generate revenue for members. It quoted the executive director as saying: "We have repositioned the organisation towards empowering the community -with the emphasis on skills development, education, and employment" (Kobokoane 1997) . In a recent article, Forrest described SANCO as a 'moribund ally', an 'empty shell' with little capacity for opposition (2003: 9) . NGOs, too, moved closer to the government and there was "increasing pressure on NGOs to 'professionalise' -code for adopting more technocratic approaches to development -with emphasis on efficient financial and management systems, and the ability to effect swift delivery" (Marais 1997 ). Boulle alluded to the danger that NGOs and CBOs were "falling into the trap of being restricted to delivery" (Boulle 1997) . The mid-to late 1990s could arguably be described as a hiatus in popular and radical activity during which proponents of social justice attempted to internalise their programmes within the state through the drafting of the new constitution, the alleviation of poverty through welfare, and the implementation of policy to redress inherited inequalities.
There were, however, divergent opinions both within the state and civil society on the best development path. As welfarist solutions were increasingly seen to be trumped by pro-growth approaches, opposition has been expressed through the re-invigoration of civil society and the development of a new generation of CBOs which seek to challenge the emerging pro-growth consensus.
These new, emerging CBOs are different from their traditional counterparts. Often they command greater technical capacity and expertise, and slot into networks with larger NGOs. One example is People's Dialogue and its community-based structures like the Homeless People's Federation. … As well, their rising expertise implies a gradual break in their former dependency on "struggle NGOs". Most importantly, they do not shy away from taking government on. (Anonymous 1997 ).
The Homeless Peoples Federation was indeed the forerunner to a host of significant social movements that were subsequently established (see Figure 1, Contemporary social movements are by no means unitary and uniform. A quick scan of the issues they represent indicates a massive diversity of concerns: land equity, gender, sexuality, racism, environment, education, formal labour, informal labour, access to infrastructure, housing, eviction, HIV/Aids treatment, crime and safety, and geo-politics. Many movements suggest that they draw from class-based ideologies with notable self-descriptions as: anti neo-liberal, anti-capital, anti-GEAR, antiglobalisation, anti-market, and pro-poor, pro-human rights, socialist and Trotskyist. However, while the material improvement of poor people's lives is at the core of many of these movements, they are by no means limited to demands for delivery or indeed to the concerns of the poor. Some also speak to legal rights, social and environmental justice, and stigmas and discrimination of certain categories of people rooted in everyday society and culture. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of second generation rights in the constitution allows for material gains to be constructed as rights, and there is increasing blurring between class based struggles and rights based struggles.
In addition to issues, social movements vary according to geographic scale. On one end of the continuum, the Concerned Citizens Forum is a largely Chatsworth based movement focusing its work on Durban. At the national scale, the TAC is strongly represented throughout the country although it may be more active in urban areas. Jubilee South Africa, on the other end of the continuum, is a local office of a global movement. Local initiatives often overcome the constraints of their geographic focus by affiliating with movements elsewhere in the country or world, as is seen in the way Durban's Self Employed Women's Union with 2000 members models itself on the Self Employed Women's Association with 500 000 members in India. These and many similar institutions are linked through the global organisation of Streetnet launched in Durban in 2002. Along with a variation of scale, movements also vary in size. According to Forrest (2003) , the Landless People's Movement aims to have 100 000 members this year and National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS claims a membership of 2000000 to 3000000. Others may have memberships of just a few hundred, or memberships that are difficult to determine as a result of their structural form.
Institutional shape is also a dimension of variation. As we have seen, some are local branches of international movements. Others, such as the National Land Committee describe themselves as independent NGOs, and yet still others are associations and networks of existing organisations such as the Coalition of South Africans for the Basic Income Grant. Finally, some still choose not to formalise their structure at all and prefer to remain unregistered and informal.
This diversity amongst contemporary social movements in terms of issues, size, institutional form, and tactics creates important methodological challenges. Is it fair to say that in all cases we are dealing with the same 'unit of analysis' and that all movements are necessarily of the same category? Can all of these social struggles necessarily be defined as social movements? How do we understand social movements within the global and national context? What are the implications of such movements for democracy in South Africa? In order to chart a course through this diversity we believe it is important to investigate the following six interpretive observations drawn from this descriptive overview. These observations build on and extend the earlier theoretical discussion.
Probably the most important factor giving rise to the emergence of contemporary social movements in South Africa is the high and growing level of poverty and inequality that characterises our society. Although much of the poverty and inequality is directly attributable to the apartheid policies of the past, they are seen to have worsened since democracy. As was discussed in section 3 above, the ANC government has been a vocal proponent of the view that integration into the global economy offers developing countries opportunities to develop and to grow rapidly. Whilst there have no doubt been winners, the economic reform process has had particularly deleterious effects on sections of the working class and the poor. These effects are most starkly felt in the labour market where unemployment has soared, with close on 40% of the workforce now without any prospect of employment for the foreseeable future. Labour intensive industries such as clothing, textiles and footwear have shrunk dramatically as the domestic market was lost to imports and local industries struggled to find markets abroad. The mining industry, for many decades the bedrock of the South African economy, has undergone a pronounced restructuring process shifting toward more capital-intensive mining and thereby shedding over 200 000 jobs (Statistics South Africa 2002) . Closer integration in the global economy has resulted in a shift away from manufacturing toward a service-based economy, and the consequent growth in part-time and sub-contracted labour processes. Where employment has grown, this has largely been in low-paid and insecure jobs in the informal economy, which is now estimated to constitute some 25 to 30 percent of all employment in South Africa (Devey et al 2003: 3) . The effects of this restructuring process are reflected in national income data, which shows higher levels of both poverty and inequality compared to that on the eve of the democratic transition in 1994.
This set of processes is catastrophic when combined with a cost-recovery model for the provision of social services. National government has devolved responsibility for the delivery of many services to local government without offering significant increases in their budgets. The only way local governments can provide these services, therefore, is to ensure that they 'pay for themselves'. In the extreme form, services are privatised, resulting -it is feared -not only in further job losses but in even more determined efforts to extract profit making revenue from residents. Yet with dramatic increases in unemployment, residents find themselves simply unable to pay for water, electricity, rents, rates, and mortgages. Together, these forces amount to a 'pincer movement' on the poor, with the state insisting that people pay for their services, housing and land while simultaneously eroding livelihoods. Desai (2002) has argued that there is no longer a 'culture of non-payment' as there was in the 1980s intended to undermine the government, but rather an 'economics of non payment' whereby individuals simply cannot afford services as a result of their marginalisation from the formal sector. Yet the government responds as if this was a problem of discipline, cutting off services and evicting delinquent residents.
A number of largely class-based social movements can be linked to this pincer movement of falling employment and increasing cost recovery for services. Some respond directly to the issue of employment and the labour market. COSATU represents -to some extent -a set of winners within the context of the transition who enjoy access to employment within the formal economy under increasingly progressive labour conditions. However, formal unions are all too aware that this is a pyrrhic victory within the context of massive job losses. The recommendation of COSATU and a variety of other organisations is a universal basic income grant, advocated and mobilised through the Coalition of South Africans for the Basic Income Grant largely in response to the fact that the labour market is not able to absorb significant portions of the population. The third labour-market related movement is the Self Employed Women's Union which is lobbying for the recognition of the informal sector as not only a legitimate source of livelihood but also an important part of the economy.
These and other movements are responding, then, to one side of the squeeze on the poor: their ability to make a living. Responses to the other side emerge from the AntiEviction Campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Concerned Citizens Forum, the Homeless People's Federation, the Soweto Electricity Crisis committee and others who oppose cost recovery for services. Through illegal reconnections, court injunctions and protest they attempt to expose the contradiction of councils demanding payment from residents who do not have sufficient incomes to pay for them. Further movements such as the Education Rights Project and the TAC address other aspects of state delivery around schooling and health.
Second, alongside these movements concerned with distributional issues are a number of social actions driven by what might be classified as social exclusionary concerns. In some cases, such as that of economic migrants and refugees, an identity may place one in the most marginal of positions in society, not only materially but also because of the xenophobic social and cultural exclusions that result from not being readily accepted into host groups. The challenges faced by this group are championed by Gauteng's coordinating Body of Refugee Communities. A variety of groups deal with the longstanding marginalisation felt by women, who often bear the brunt of deprivation. Identity-related concerns are also taken up by groups such as the Gay and Lesbian Equality project who have made shrewd use of the legal system in order to end institutionalised discrimination against sexual minorities.
Identity is seen by the literature on 'new social movements' to be the basis of postindustrial popular mobilisation. It is possible to suggest that in South Africa, certain sections of post-industrial society, including new black elites, are finding expression through these forms. However, in the examples outlined above, we see that identity questions of citizenship, gender, and sexuality often exacerbate material disadvantage, and are not the indulgent concerns of a 'classless' petit-bourgeoisie. Indeed, there is a notable absence in South Africa of new social movements of the kinds described in the industrialised world as -perhaps -middle class individuals concerned with social and economic justice orient their energies to poor sectors of society rather than their own privileged predicaments. Social movements including those in South Africa are made up of both winners and losers of the processes of economic transformation discussed above.
Third, social movements are not 'spontaneous grassroots uprisings of the poor' as they are sometimes romantically imagined, but are dependent to a large extent on a sufficient base of material and human resources, solidarity networks, and often the external interventions of prominent personalities operating from within well resourced institutions. The TAC's Zackie Achmad has direct access to and public support from Nelson Mandela. The Education Rights Project emerges from the Centre for Applied Legal Studies and the Education Policy Unit. The Concerned Citizens' Forum was formed and driven by Fatima Meer at the University of Natal and Ashwin Desai, an independent writer. Leadership is sometimes shared between movements, with, for example, Trevor Ngwane being associated with both the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee. Such individuals are crucial to the very existence of movements not only because they organise effective campaigns, but also for their ability to leverage resources from donor funders who are increasingly allocating money to support court cases and other actions undertaken by social movements. Furthermore, the histories of these individuals, frequently linked to the liberation movement, provide them with access to key players within government for the purposes of accessing information, attending important meetings and influencing policy.
Solidarity among movements goes beyond shared leadership. In Laclau and Mouffe's words, "different positions can become united in a chain of equivalence " (1985: 131) . In South Africa, many new movements are affiliated with one another and are Fourth, contemporary social movements are products of the opportunities and constraints generated by the post-1994 political environment. The new political, economic and social order is underwritten by a constitution that enshrines first and second generation rights, clauses that have been used by a number of social movements to either defend themselves or advance their campaigns. Note, for instance, the TAC's successful court challenge against government on the provision of anti-retroviral drugs to HIV/Aids sufferers. There has been an undeniable opening up of the state since 1994. There is much more democratic engagement with various societal forums. Increasingly, instruments and spaces have become available for the state to engage with civil society, and indeed, for civil society actors to challenge the state. NEDLAC, the media, the courts, and the constitution, formalised attempts to have public input into most policies, and even rhetorical support for mass demonstrations provide a significant repertoire of 'in-system' mechanisms for influencing policy and challenging the government.
But there are some negative features beginning to develop in the post apartheid political system. Some point to undemocratic tendencies in the highest echelons of government, reflected, in particular, through the stigmatization of the 'ultra-left' and the desire to repress protests (Bond 2000 : 140, Desai 2002 ). Vally expresses concern that there is a trend towards authoritarianism in the post apartheid political environment:
In addition to the apartheid-era laws such as Regulation of Gatherings Act, a smorgasbord of Bills, which gave the security and intelligence agencies additional powers, are in the offing. These include the Interception and Monitoring Bill, Intelligence Services Bill, the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Bill, the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Bill (Vally 2003) .
The perception by some, therefore, is that the political freedoms anticipated for post apartheid South Africa may not always be available in practise.
Fifth, social movements' engagements with the state fall on a continuum between insystem collaborative interactions on the one extreme, and out-of-system adversarial relations on the other. It is important to highlight immediately that there is a lack of consensus within movements over the best strategic approach. Some fear cooptation by the government and therefore wish to avoid collaboration, while others favour reformism and constructive engagement. While some movements such as the Landless People's Movement limit themselves to mass mobilisation, others choose to make extensive use of a wider range of democratic spaces afforded by South Africa's post apartheid political system. One example is the celebrated 'Grootboom case' in 2000 in which the Human Rights Commission and the University of the Western Cape's Community Law Centre acting on behalf of an informal settlement successfully took the government to the constitutional court in order to hold it to the right to adequate housing and services.
Given this existence of institutionalised avenues of action, movements recognise that the most belligerent tactics may not be the most expedient way of achieving material goals and it is often useful to apply both 'friendly' and 'unfriendly' pressure. To use the TAC as an example, early successes were achieved in the courts where the TAC cooperated with the government in confronting global copyright laws around the use of generic drugs. This was followed by a second phase of attempting to force the government to provide drugs through the forum of NEDLAC. After the TAC believed the government had become intransigent, it returned to the courts to force the Minister of Health, Dr Mantho Tshabalala-Msimang, to provide drugs that would prevent mother to child transmission. This was successful and was followed by a defiance campaign in an attempt to broaden provision. Recently, the campaign was suspended in order to provide a face-saving way for the government to announce the provision of such drugs. Such calculations represent a constantly evolving relationship between the movement and the government in which the movement seeks to reconstitute instruments of deprivation as instruments of change. Through this repertoire of tactics, it has been demonstrated that power does not reside exclusively with political or economic elites, and it is possible for even marginalised players to exert influence over policy and practice through various tactics such as shaming, de-legitimisation, or even the threat to vote for another party. The terms of engagement are shaped from both sides, and the very presence of a social movement may influence a political order.
Yet, it has to be asked whether the strategies and tactics of the TAC are replicable to other issue areas? After all, is the HIV/AIDS struggle not unique in that it draws support across racial, class and other social backgrounds? Moreover, is it not true that resources, expertise and skills are often the primary factors in influencing the choice of a movement's strategies? If this is the case, then are not social movements representing and organizing the disadvantaged and marginalised within our communities prone to 'out-of-system' mass outbursts of anger, while those in more privileged circumstances may have luxury of 'in-system' collaborative interactions and engagements (Guha 2000:4) ? Finally, the systemic impact of contemporary social movements may well facilitate the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Some, particularly in government, see these social movements as a threat to stable democracy. This is an overreaction not in the least inspired by their institutional location and oversensitivity to political criticism. Social movements contribute to the plurality of civil society, which is one of the essential elements in a system of checks and balances indispensable to all mature democracies (Habib 2003) . Just as important to note is the fact that most of the contemporary social movements operate within the parameters of the new status quo. There is no immediate challenge to the legitimacy of the government, and there is still much loyalty to the constitution. These movements are thus not, as yet, about overthrowing the existing order. Instead, they are about holding this government accountable for the delivery of promises it made, and prising the political and socio-economic order open so that more constituencies can be included in its list of beneficiaries.
It needs to be noted, however, that the systemic commitment of most social movements cannot be taken for granted. Ultimately, it depends on the responsiveness of the political system. If significant sectors of society are consistently alienated from this political order, and if a revolutionary or counter revolutionary party were to emerge and serve as an alternative political pole around which critics would coalesce, then, social movements could become the building blocks for a new systemic project. That would, however, require extreme unresponsiveness from the political authorities, significant alienation in society, and ultimately the emergence of a political party committed to overthrowing the existing order. None of these factors currently exist, or are likely in the immediate future. The surest route to quickly realizing such a state of affairs would be if political elites were to forget their social contract with their citizenry and instead engage in the primitive accumulation of wealth through the mindless plunder of the nation's resources. Alternatively, political elites might at least rhetorically re-engage the notion of the social contract as the ANC did in its 2004 election campaign and Mbeki signalled in his May 2004 State of the Nation address. Such actions may work to demobilise movements, particularly if there is a popular perception that government is able to incorporate and address at least some of their demands.
Conclusion
A final question remains to be raised: How do South Africa's new social movements fit into and inform the broader literature on movements, globalisation and marginalisation? Clearly, the new movements which have emerged in South Africa over the past five years are responding to the changing social, economic and political context in which they find themselves. They build upon old networks, innovate and extend them as they devise new identities for mobilisation and define new targets of action.
Understandings of globalisation and marginalisation and their relationship to political formations should -therefore -not be seen as explanatory in themselves, but rather serve as a basis for inquiry. While movements such as the APF and the AEC clearly challenge neo-liberal economic policies, other movements do not interpret their objectives in 'anti-neoliberal' terms at all, but may cite religious imperatives, first and second generation constitutional rights, sexual orientation and gender inequality, environmental justice and other motives. Some of these may even credit 'globalisation' with the arrival of more progressive values in South Africa enabling the promotion of -for example -gay rights.
Whether this be Pagad's promotion of conservative religious values, the TAC's advocacy of the availability of HIV/Aids treatment, or the APF's challenge to the government's policies on privatisation, social movements challenge mainstream policies and approaches on political, social, economic and often moral grounds. The existence of these political formations in post apartheid South Africa representsmost fundamentally -a belief by those who participate that they need to force a shift in society's dominant values. There is no singular direction which these movements pursue and the outcome of their interactions with state and corporate actors remains uncertain.
Despite this diversity of movements and the indeterminacy of outcomes, a number of central theoretical arguments emerge from these cases. First, these movements as a whole do not neatly fit into any of the three broad categories of movements offered at the outset: the so-called "old" movements which directly challenged the state seeking reform or revolution, the notion of "new" movements based on identity-oriented concerns whose target was less the state itself but rather society, and social change, more broadly, or the "new-new" global movements which together challenge a single understanding of and pathway for globalisation. South Africa's new movements introduce elements of each of these three heuristic models.
Second, all of the movements are uniquely informed by the post-apartheid moment in South Africa and the ways in which global and local processes of change have come together to marginalise and empower new actors. This has provided new environments for identification, even as most movements continue to focus on what are often termed "bread and butter" issues. The new political dispensation has broadened the range of targets beyond the state to include corporate and civil society actors. Still the economic dimensions of marginalisation, variously interpreted, define the majority of these movements in ways in which we have not seen in the advanced capitalist states. Unfortunately, the experiences of movement actors in these societies have far too frequently formed the central context for theoretical studies of social movements. New social movement theories have often implied that new identities supersede established political identities; this is not the case here. The economic dimension of identity still informs the majority of these movements in a way in which we do not see in Western Europe and the United States.
This new hybrid of movements cross-cut common boundaries established by movement studies. Just as we have sought to move beyond a simple three fold model of political opportunity, networks and identity to bring these aspects together into productive conversation, so too we must seek to cross-cut old notions of movement strategies, formation and targets to understand the growing phenomena of South Africa's new social movements.
